Platform map

Service ownership

Service	Owns	Does not own
gateway	TLS, public routing, WebSockets	repository data or application builds
frontend	discovery and repository presentation	Git history or Space processes
forgejo	repositories, auth, permissions, issues, PRs, Actions metadata	host container lifecycle
spaces-runner	Space validation, clone, build, lifecycle, Pages serving	user identity source
seed	idempotent sample/bootstrap data	long-running request handling
maintenance-agent	Issue-triggered /goal, evidence gates, guarded merge	unrestricted host control
forgejo-actions-runner	repository workflows in isolated DinD	the host Docker socket

Public route map

https://host/
├─ /models /datasets /spaces /skills /mcps /prompts → frontend
├─ /openface/{repository}                         → frontend repository view
├─ /git/                                          → Forgejo
├─ /run/{owner}/{space}/                          → running Space proxy
├─ /runner-api/                                   → runner control/data API
└─ /pages/{owner}/{repository}/                   → published Pages

State map

• Forgejo volumes: repositories, users, permissions, issues, PRs, Actions metadata.
• Runner volumes: registration, shared control token, runtime metadata.
• Docker: built images, running Space containers, build cache.
• Git checkout: Compose, frontend, service code, sample definitions, docs—never production secrets.

Trust boundaries

The browser authenticates against Forgejo. The frontend asks the runner to perform privileged lifecycle operations through a shared internal token. The runner validates repository permission before control operations. Agent identities use separate scoped tokens; Claude runs as an unprivileged container user without the host Docker socket or bot credentials.